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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 This paper shows that free trade reduces the welfare of a small country with unemployment 
unless the free trade price if the importable falls below the autarky equivalent price.  A decline in 
the price of the importable from the autarky level not only improves the terms of trade but also 
reduces employment and production in the importable sector.  A numerical example illustrates 
that the autarky equivalent price of the importable can be substantially lower than the autarky 
price.  If an optimal tariff is used, however, restricted trade improves welfare above the autarky 
level.
 
 
 
 
 
WELFARE REDUCING TRADE AND 
OPTIMAL TRADE POLICY 
 
 
Introduction 
 Trade theorists have long believed that free trade necessarily improves the welfare of a 
small country.  In a brilliant paper Kemp (1968, p. 158) suggested the possibility of a 
paradox that an improvement in the terms of trade results in a welfare loss.1  Johnson (1965) 
further argued that with factor price rigidity free trade may actually reduce the welfare of a 
small open economy, a special case of the Kemp paradox.  Batra and Pattanaik (1970), 
however, demonstrate that even in the presence of factor price rigidity and factor immobility, 
free trade still dominates autarky because “production gain” is zero but “consumption gain” 
is positive, and further suggest that the possibility of a negative optimal tariff cannot be ruled 
out a priori. 
 The possibility of welfare reducing trade has since been largely discounted and treated 
only as a theoretical curiosity.  Due to a growing recognition that foreign imports are the 
cause of high unemployment, however, the protectionist mood has been spreading in the 
United States.  The literature has also begun to investigate the link between unemployment 
and trade.  Specifically, Batra and Beladi (1990) investigated the impacts of unemployment 
on the pattern of trade, citing widespread unemployment even in developed countries such as 
the United Kingdom and the United States in the 1930s as well as in the 1980s.  In many 
countries the minimum wage is considered to be set by institutional arrangements such as 
unions or minimum wage legislations.  Chao and Yu (1990) showed that an improvement in 
the terms of trade need not raise welfare of an economy suffering from urban unemployment.  
If imports of less expensive foreign goods are to raise domestic unemployment, some trade 
restrictions might prove beneficial.  Batra (1992) also suggested that a movement towards 
freer trade in America led to productivity slowdown and lower real wages since 1972, and 
hence for the vast majority of people whose main income comes from labor earnings, freer 
trade generated increased poverty in the United States. 
 This paper formulates a disequilibrium trade model with sticky money wages that has 
been generalized to fix-price economies where output prices as well as wages are fixed, 
independent of excess demand or supply in the labor and goods markets.  This paper differs 
 from existing literature in two important respects.  First, unlike the models that only suggest 
the possibility of welfare reducing trade, this paper demonstrates that a decline in the price of 
the importable from the autarky level caused by free trade will necessarily reduce the welfare 
of a small country with unemployment. With unemployment, the economy can enjoy 
consumption gain from free trade, but production gain may become negative so that it 
outweighs any consumption gain.  That is, the Kemp paradox necessarily occurs in the 
neighborhood of autarky.  To demonstrate this result, we assume à la Batra and Beladi (1990) 
and Yu (1982) that only wage is rigid, permitting interest rate flexibility. 
 Second, we construct a numerical example to illustrate that even if the free trade price of 
the importable falls substantially below the autarky level, a small country with 
unemployment may not recover from the negative welfare shock from the increase in 
unemployment.  It is noteworthy that the amount of labor employed changes with the relative 
commodity price as a result of inequality between the marginal rate of transformation in 
production and the relative commodity price.  As the price of the importable declines, 
welfare begins to improve beyond a certain point.  When the price of the importable falls to 
the autarky equivalent price, the positive terms of trade effect exactly offsets the negative 
welfare effect of increased unemployment.  Hence, this paper attempts to formally identify 
situations where tariff serves as an employment-protecting device.  A numerical example 
illustrates a case where free trade does not improve welfare until the price of the importable 
declines to 50 percent of the autarky level.  We also examine in this case whether autarky 
should be maintained, or a nonprohibitive import tariff should be used to offset the adverse 
welfare effect of opening trade. 
 After describing the model and its solution, we discuss the implications of changing 
tariff rates on the foreign products. We then construct a numerical example to show that our 
result is a possibility for many countries with unemployment, then analyze the issues of 
optimal tariff.  We conclude with some general remarks. 
 
Fixed Money Wage and Welfare Reducing Trade 
 A small open economy with unemployed resources operates inside its production 
possibility frontier.  Unemployment arises from imperfections in the factor markets.  
Harberler (1950), Johnson (1965), and Jones and Norman (1979) asserted that wages tend to 
be rigid due to institutional limitations.  In The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money Keynes (1935, p. 268) argued that if money wages are inflexible “the greatest 
practicable fairness will be maintained between labor and the factors whose remuneration is 
contractually fixed in terms of money, in particular the rentier class and persons with fixed 
 salaries.”  Keynes further argued that while wage flexibility expedites resource transfers 
between industries, “money wage level as a whole should be maintained as stable as possible, 
at any rate in the short period” (p. 270).  On the other hand, Keynes believed that interest rate 
is flexible, albeit he was uncertain about the effectiveness of monetary policy to control 
interest rate. 
 For these reasons we consider a Keynesian open economy with fixed money wage and 
flexible interest rate to investigate the welfare effect of free trade and optimal trade policies.  
To lay the basis for analyzing the welfare effects of free trade for a small country with money 
wage rigidity,2 we adapt Batra and Beladi (1990) and Jones and Norman (1979) with the 
following assumptions: 
 (i) The domestic economy consists of N identical consumers. 
 (ii) Two factors, capital K and labor L, are used to produce two goods, the exportable z 
and the importable y. 
 (iii) The exportable is the numeraire, and the domestic price q and the foreign price q* 
of the exportable are equal to unity.  The economy is small and the foreign price of 
the importable p* is exogenous. 
 (iv) In the short run the domestic wage w is rigid and does not respond to random 
changes in the domestic and foreign prices.  Capital is fully employed, and mobile 
between sectors.  The interest rate r is flexible and responds to price changes. 
 (v) Perfect competition prevails in product markets and the capital market. 
  Let Z and Y denote the domestic production of the exportable z and the importable y.  
Outputs of the traded goods are given by 
  Z = F(Lz,Kz),               Y = G(Ly,Ky), 
and the production functions F(@) and G(@) are assumed to be concave in inputs, where Li and 
Ki denote labor and capital employed in sector i, i = z,y.3 Producers in the export sector 
choose Lz and Kz to maximize profits, 
  Bz = qF(Lz,Kz) - wLz - rKz.  (1) 
 
The first-order conditions are: 
 
  qFL - w = 0,   qFK - r = 0,  (1N) 
  
where q = q* = 1, and the subscripts denote partial derivatives.  Similarly, producers in the 
import sector choose Ly and Ky to maximize profits, 
  By = pG(Ly,Ky) - wLy - rKy,  (2) 
The first-order conditions are:  
  pGL - w = 0,   pGK - r = 0.  (2N) 
It is important to note that an increase in the price of one product does not directly affect 
factor demands in the other sector.  However, an increase in the price of the importable 
affects the demand for capital in that sector and increases the interest rate.  Thus, an increase 
in the price of the importable affects labor demand in the export sector indirectly via a 
change in interest rate.  The input demand functions can be written 
 
 Lz = Lz(q,w,r),  Kz = Kz(q,w,r),  Ly = Ly(p,w,r),  Ky = Ky(p,w,r). 
 
 Consumer preferences are represented by a monotone increasing utility function, 
U = U(C,X), where C denotes domestic consumption of the exportable and X denotes 
domestic consumption of the importable.  The budget constraint of the consumer is C + pX = 
I, where I is income in terms of the numeraire good.  The first-order condition is: UX/UC = 
p.  Let C = C(p,I) and X = X(p,I) denote the demand functions for C and X.  Then the 
indirect utility function is written 
 
  V(p,I) / U[C(p,I),X(p,I)]. 
 
 To reduce domestic unemployment the government restricts trade by imposing a tariff             
t = p ! p* on imports.  The import demand function is 
 
  Q(p,I) = X(p,I) ! Y(p),  (3) 
 
which implies QI = XI.  The government revenue from trade taxes is 
 
   g = (p ! p*)Q.  (4) 
Following the convention, the tariff revenue is rebated to consumers. 
 The aggregate profit, B = Bz + By , is returned to consumers as dividends.  In addition to 
profit dividend, B, and tariff rebate, (p - p*)Q, consumers also receive income from the sale 
of factor services.  The consumer receives w(Lz + Ly) + r(Kz + Ky) from the factor markets.  
Hence, consumer income is 
  I = F(Lz,Kz) + pG(Ly,Ky) + (p - p*)Q. (5) 
 
Unemployment and Foreign Price of the Importable 
 How does free trade affect the welfare of a small country with unemployed resources?  
To put it differently, if a small country adopts a free trade policy (p = p*), how does a change 
in the foreign price of the importable affect unemployment?  Free trade necessarily results in 
a decrease in the price of the importable below the autarky level, at least in the two-good 
world.  An increase (decrease) in the price of the importable encourages (discourages) 
domestic production of the importable.  If the economy is operating along the production 
possibility frontier, the expanding import sector must attract resources from the other sector, 
and hence an increase in the foreign price of the importable necessarily reduces the domestic 
supply of the exportable. 
 If both factors are not fully employed, increased production of the importable can be 
obtained by utilizing unemployed resources without contracting the export sector.  However, 
when labor is unemployed and capital is fully employed, a change in the price of the 
importable affects the production of the exportable indirectly via a change in the interest rate. 
 We first focus on the direct effect.  For a given interest rate, an improvement in the 
terms of trade caused by a decline in p* does not affect employment or production in the 
export sector; i.e., 
 
   MLz/Mp = MKz/Mp = MZ/Mp = 0.  (6) 
 
However, we show that a decline in the import price reduces employment of normal factors 
in the import sector.  From the first-order conditions in (2N), 
  MLy/Mp = (GKGKL ! GLGKK)/p), (7a) 
   MKy/Mp = (GLGKL ! GKGLL)/p), (7b) 
 MY/Mp = GL(MLy/Mp) + GK(MKy/Mp) > 0, (7c) 
where ) / GLLGKK ! (GKL)2 > 0 by concavity of the production function, and (MY/Mp) > 0 
by convexity of the cost function. 
 Consider the cost minimization problem to produce a given output ?Y, and let Lz  (?Y,w,r) 
and Kz(?Y,w,r) be the cost minimizing levels of inputs to produce ?Y.  Assume that both labor 
and capital are strictly normal factors in industry y; i.e., dLy/d?Y > 0 and dKy/d?Y > 0.  It can 
be shown that labor is a normal input if GKGKL ! GLGKK > 0.  Similarly, capital is a 
normal input if GLGKL ! GKGLL > 0).  Thus, if K and L are normal inputs, then MLy/Mp > 0 
and MKy/Mp > 0. 
 How does a decline in the foreign price of the importable affect domestic 
unemployment?  Let L = Lz + Ly denote the aggregate demand for labor, and Lu = !L - L 
denote the labor unemployment.  Recall that MLz/Mp = 0 and MLy/Mp > 0, and hence MLu/Mp < 
0.  Thus, for a given interest rate, an increase in p increases aggregate demand for labor and 
reduces unemployment. 
 
Unemployment and Welfare Reducing Trade 
 Observe that an indirect utility, V(p*,Z + p*Y), is inversely related to p* but positively 
related with national income, Z + p*Y.  Thus, a decline in the price of the importable affects 
welfare in two opposite directions; the terms of trade effect on welfare is positive, but the 
income effect is negative.  We show that unless the price of the importable falls below the 
autarky equivalent price the negative income effect dominates the terms of trade effect. 
 Consider how national welfare is affected by a fall in the foreign price of the importable.  
If p = p*, the expression for national income in (5) reduces to I = Z + p*Y.  Recall from (1N) 
that an increase in the price the importable does not directly affect the output of the export 
sector, but indirectly via a change in the interest rate. 
 How does an increase in r affect the factor demands and output in the export sector?  
Differentiating (1N) yields 
  MLz/Mr = - FKL/qL,  (8a) 
  MKz/Mr = FLL/qL,  (8b) 
 where L / FLLFKK - (FKL)2 > 0 by concavity of production function F(@).  Differentiating Z 
with respect to r gives 
  MZ/Mr = FL(MLz/Mr) + FK(MKz/Mr) = (FKFLL - FLFKL)/qL. 
Using a cost minimization problem for a given output, it can be shown that FK - 
FL(FKL/FLL) is positive (negative) if K is a normal (an inferior) factor.  Thus, MZ/Mr is 
negative (positive) if K is a normal (inferior) factor. 
 Equilibrium in the domestic capital market is given by 
  Kz(q,w,r) + Ky(p,w,r) = !K.  (9) 
Equation (9) defines how the equilibrium interest rate r(p) responds to a change in p.  
Differentiating (9) with respect to p gives 
  dr/dp = - (MKy/Mp)/[MKz/Mr + MKy/Mr]. (10) 
Recall from (7b) that MKy/Mp > 0 if K is a normal input.  Thus, if K is a normal input, an 
increase in the price of the importable increases demand for capital and raises the interest 
rate, dr/dp > 0.  Observe that 
  dI/dp* = Y + p*(dY/dp*) + dZ/dp* 
   = Y + w(dLy/dp*) + r(dKy/dp*) + w(dLz/dp*) + r(dKz/dp*) 
   = Y + w(dL/dp*),  (11) 
where L = Lz + Ly is aggregate demand, L < !L, and dKy/dp* + dKz/dp* = 0 since capital is 
fully employed. 
 An increase in p not only affects the labor demand in the import sector for a given 
interest rate (direct effect), but also affects it indirectly by raising the interest rate.  Thus, the 
total effects on labor demands can be written 
  dLz/dp = (MLz/Mr)(dr/dp), 
  dLy/dp = (MLy/Mp) + (MLy/Mr)(dr/dp). 
From (8a), MLz/Mr < (>) 0 if K and L are complements (substitutes) in the production of Z.  
Similarly, MLy/Mr < (>) 0 if K and L are complements (substitutes) in the production of Y.  
Thus, if K and L are complements (substitutes), the indirect effects, (MLi/Mr)(dr/dp), are 
 negative (positive), i = y,z.  If K and L are substitutes, then dLi/dp > 0, but the sign of dL/dp* 
= (MLz/Mr)(dr/dp) + (MLy/Mr)(dr/dp) + (MLy/Mp) is indeterminate if K and L are complements.  
However, the direct effects are likely to more than offset the indirect effects.  Hereafter, we 
assume that an increase in the price of the importable increases aggregate demand for labor, 
dL/dp* > 0. 
 Differentiating V(p*,Z + p*Y) with respect to p* and using Roy's identity, Vp = - VIX, 
and (11) gives 
  dV/dp* = VI[- Q + w(dL/dp*)], (12) 
which is generally indeterminate.  When evaluated at the autarky price pA, Q = 0, and hence 
dV/dp* = VI@w(dL/dp*)> 0.  That is, the initial welfare impact of opening up trade depends 
on the employment effect. 
Proposition I: Assume that money wage is fixed and interest rate is flexible.  If dL/dp* > 0, 
then a decline in the price of the importable from the autarky level initially reduces welfare 
of a small country. 
 Observe that if labor is fully employed, dL/dp* = d!L/dp* = 0 in (12), and dV/dp* = - 
VIQ.  In this case, Q > (<) 0 and dV/dp* < (>) 0 for p < (>) p*.  Thus, indirect utility is 
minimized at the autarky price.  However, when labor is unemployed, a minimum of indirect 
utility occurs at a price somewhere below the autarky price, pA. 
 
A Numerical Example 
 We have shown that there is a price interval in which a small open economy with 
unemployment loses from free trade.  There is an autarky equivalent price pB at which the 
small country is just as well off as under autarky; i.e., V(pB,Z + pBY) = V(pA,Z + pAY).  If 
the foreign price of the importable falls below the autarky equivalent price (p* < pB), the 
terms of trade effect dominates the negative income effect and the country gains from free 
trade, despite its adverse impact on unemployment. 
 We now construct a concrete example to illustrate that the price of the importable may 
have to fall substantially below the autarky price for free trade to improve the welfare of a 
small open economy with unemployment.  Consider a utility function U(C,X) = CX, which 
yields equal output shares in autarky.  Demand functions are given by C = I/2 and X = I/2p, 
 where I = Z + p*Y is consumer income under free trade.  The indirect utility is 
  V = I2/4p = [Z + p*Y]2/4p*.  (13) 
The import demand function is Q = I/2p* - Y.  Recall that if p* = pA, then Q = 0.  Thus, pA 
satisfies 
  Z = pAY(pA). 
That is, each sector produces one-half of national income in autarky.  Differentiating V with 
respect to p* gives 
 
  dV/dp* = [p*Y - Z + 2p*(dZ/dp*) + 2p*2(dY/dp*)](I/4p*2). 
Evaluating dV/dp* at pA and utilizing Z = pAY(pA) gives 
 
  dV/dp*?pA = [dZ/dp* + pA(dY/dp*)]Y > 0. (14) 
That is, if free trade results in a small decrease in the price of the importable from the autarky 
level, opening up trade reduces welfare.  For a large price change, however, the terms of 
trade effect may dominate the output effect. 
 The example further illustrates that the range of the price interval in which free trade is 
welfare reducing can be relatively wide.  Recall that an increase in the price of the importable 
p* increases demand for capital in the import sector and raises the interest rate, which in turn 
raises production cost and reduces production in the export sector; i.e., dZ/dp* < 0. 
 To capture the indirect effect of a decrease in p* on the production of the exportable 
through the flexible interest rate, consider a linear supply schedule of the exportable, Z = 4/3 
- (1/3)p*, and a linear supply schedule of the importable, Y(p*) = p*.  Domestic income is  
I = Z + p*Y = 4/3 - (1/3)p* + p*2, and import demand is Q = [4/3 - (1/3)p* + p*2]/2p* - p*.  
Then the indirect utility reduces to 
  V = I2/4p = [4/3 - (1/3)p* + p*2]2/4p*. (15) 
At autarky Q = 0 or Z = p*Y = p*2.  Thus, the autarky price of the importable is 
  pA = 1, 
 and the level of indirect utility at autarky is 
  VA = 1. 
Recall from (11) that 
  w(dL/dp*) = dZ/dp* + p*(dY/dp*) = - (1/3) + p*, 
which is positive when p* = pA = 1, and hence a decrease in p* below pA increases labor 
unemployment.  Differentiating I and V with respect to p* gives 
 
  dI/dp* = Y + (dZ/dp*) + p*(dY/dp*) = - (1/3) + 2p*. 
 
  dV/dp* = VI@[-Q + (dZ/dp*) + p*(dY/dp*)]. 
 
When evaluated at pA = 1, Q = 0, dI/dp* = 5/3 and dV/dp* = (2/3)@VI > 0.  Thus, opening up 
trade, caused by a small decrease in p* from pA, reduces domestic welfare.  However, beyond 
a certain point, further decreases in p* will improve welfare and there is an autarky 
equivalent price pB at which free trade results in the same level of utility as in autarky.  The 
autarky equivalent price is pB . 0.5033. 
 The negative welfare effect of opening up trade is illustrated in Figure 1.  As the price of 
the importable declines from the autarky level pA = 1, welfare initially declines in the 
neighborhood of autarky.  Welfare continues to fall until it reaches a minimum.  As the terms 
of trade improve beyond this point, import volume increases and welfare begins to rise.  At 
pB . 0.5, free trade provides the same level of welfare as in autarky.  This example 
demonstrates that for free trade to improve the welfare of a small open economy with 
unemployment, the price of the importable may have to decline significantly below the 
autarky level pA.  Note that since U(@) is an ordinal utility function, a monotone increasing 
transformation of the direct utility U or the indirect utility V has no effect on the level of pB. 
 
Optimal Tariff 
 Since the economy operates inside the production possibility curve in the short run, 
imports of “cheap” foreign goods increases domestic unemployment and may adversely 
affect national welfare.  Thus, free trade may not be optimal and a small country with 
unemployment may use trade restrictions to lessen the adverse employment and welfare 
effects of imports.4 
 To correct domestic market distortions, Johnson (1965, p. 8) recommended “the 
simplest remedy, a tax or subsidy, imposed at the point where the distortion occurs.”  
 Although the optimal production subsidy is theoretically superior to the optimal tariff to cope 
with unemployment, trade restrictions have been more popular politically.5 A commonly 
cited reason for avoiding a production subsidy is that the subsidy must be appropriated 
annually.  Since annual appropriations must be reviewed periodically and the outcome may 
be uncertain, producers have favored trade restrictions.  Once instituted, protection tends to 
become automatic and irreversible. 
 For these reasons, we consider optimal trade restriction.  Brecher (1974) earlier argued 
that a tariff may improve the welfare of a small country with labor unemployment.  In 
contrast, Batra and Seth (1977) suggested the paradoxical possibility that the optimal tariff 
may be negative.  We now investigate the properties of optimal tariff and show that restricted 
trade with a positive optimal tariff dominates free trade.  The policymaker is assumed to 
employ only a tariff to offset the adverse welfare impacts of unemployment resulting from a 
decline in the foreign price.  The policymaker's problem is to choose the domestic price p (/ 
p* + t) to maximize the indirect utility 
  J = V[p,Z + pY + (p - p*)Q].  (16) 
The first-order condition is: dJ/dp / VI[(dZ/dp) + p(dY/dp) + (p - p*)(dQ/dp)] = 0, or 
  (dZ/dp) + p(dY/dp) + t(dQ/dp) = 0. (16N) 
From (11), dZ/dp + p(dY/dp) = w(dL/dp), and hence the optimal tariff is given by 
  te = - w(dL/dp)/(dQ/dp).  (17) 
Note that if the wage rate is flexible and labor is fully employed, producers jointly maximize 
revenue R = Z + pY, and hence, (dZ/dp) + p(dY/dp) = dL/dp = 0.  In this case t = 0; i.e., the 
optimal tariff for a small full employment economy is zero.  However, if labor is not fully 
employed, then dL/dp > and the optimal tariff is positive for a small country operating inside 
its production possibility frontier.6 
 If the country uses a sufficiently high tariff it can achieve full employment.  But is the 
full employment tariff optimal for a small country with labor unemployment?  Let tf > 0 be 
the full employment tariff and pf = p* + tf now be the domestic price that induces full 
employment.  Then at pf, producer revenue R = Z + pY is maximized, (dZ/dp) + p(dY/dp) = 
0, and hence dJ/dp is negative.  Thus, the full employment tariff is higher than the optimal 
 tariff (tf > te).  Recall from (16N) that the necessary condition for the optimal tariff te to be 
positive is that w(dL/dp) = (dZ/dp) + p(dY/dp) > 0.  This implies that there is some 
unemployment at the optimal tariff. 
 If the optimal tariff is used, does restricted trade improve welfare and dominate autarky?  
A change in p* affects welfare directly and also indirectly through the adjustment of the 
optimal tariff.  The objective function is written as 
  J = V[p* + t,Z + (p* + t)Y + tQ]. (18) 
Note that dJ/dp* = (MJ/Mp*) + (MJ/Mp)(dp/dp*) and that MJ/Mp = 0 by (16N).  Differentiating 
(18) with respect to p* and using the envelope theorem yields 
  MJ/Mp* = VI•[- Q + t(MQ/Mp*)],  (19) 
where MQ/Mp* measures the effect of a change in p* on import demand, holding p constant.  
From (3), if the importable is a normal good (XI > 0), then MQ/Mp* = XI(MI/Mp*).  
Differentiating I = Z + pY + (p - p*)Q with respect to p*, holding p constant, yields 
  (MI/Mp*) = - Q + (p - p*)(MQ/Mp*). 
If XI > 0, then MQ/Mp* = - XIQ/(1 - tXI) < 0, and it must be distinguished from  
dQ/dp* = MQ/Mp* + (MQ/Mp)(dp/dp*), which measures the effect of an increase in p* on 
import while allowing the optimal tariff t and domestic price p to adjust.  At the autarky price 
pA, Q = 0, MQ/Mp* = MJ/Mp* = 0, and hence the indirect utility reaches a minimum.  If XI > 0, 
then MQ/Mp* < 0 and MJ/Mp* < 0 for all Q > 0, and hence an improvement in the terms of trade 
necessarily increases welfare.  If Q < 0, then MQ/Mp* > 0 and MJ/Mp* > 0.  Thus, the indirect 
utility is roughly U-shaped and reaches a minimum at autarky when the optimal tariff is 
employed.  That is, optimally restricted trade yields higher welfare than autarky. 
 
Proposition II:  Assume that the money wage is fixed and the interest rate is flexible in a 
small country.  Then 
    (i) the optimal tariff te is less than the full employment tariff tf, and hence does not 
eliminate unemployment, and 
   (ii) if the importable is a normal good, restricted trade with an optimal tariff improves 
welfare. 
It is important to note that an optimal tariff is also less than a full employment tariff in Choi 
 and Beladi (1993) where the interest rate is fixed.  Part (ii) of this proposition is more general 
in that interest rate is flexible and there is no price uncertainty.  The main crux of our 
argument in Proposition II is the assurance that with unemployment, restricted trade with 
optimal tariff will always be welfare-improving. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 The possibility of welfare-reducing trade has been treated only as a theoretical rarity in 
the literature and has not been seriously examined.  This paper demonstrates that free trade 
initially reduces welfare of a small open economy with unemployed resources; i.e., the Kemp 
paradox necessarily occurs in the neighborhood of autarky.  This is because opening up trade 
initially increases domestic unemployment when money wage is rigid.  In other words, this 
paper highlights the existence of a trade-off between the terms of trade gain from reducing 
the domestic price of imports and the loss in welfare due to the decrease in domestic 
production of the importable good that eventually leads to a higher unemployment level. 
 In the numerical example the output shares of the export and import sectors are equal in 
autarky, and the price of the importable must fall more than 50 percent from the autarky level 
before the trading country becomes as well off as under autarky.  Examples with different 
output shares can easily be constructed where the export share is rising.  If the optimal tariff 
is employed, restricted trade improves welfare and hence autarky is not an optimal policy.  
These findings suggest that trade policy may be warranted to offset the negative impact of 
trade when labor is unemployed. 
  
 
Table 1. Welfare Reducing Trade 
p* V 
 0.01000 44.2291 
 0.10000      4.29025   
0.20000      2.13422   
0.30000      1.45934   
 0.40000      1.15600   
0.50000      1.00347   
 0.50331      1.00000    
 0.60000      0.92919   
0.70000      0.90289   
0.80000      0.91022   
 0.90000      0.94385   
1.00000      1.00000   
 
     
  
 
 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1. Batra and Pattanaik (1970) also observed the Kemp paradox.  For more recent analyses of 
terms of trade shocks and welfare, see also Marjit (1990) and Choi and Beladi (1993). 
2. Real wage may be rigid or flexible, depending on the choice of the numeraire.  Since the 
nominal wage w is fixed, the real wage, w/q, is also fixed, but w/p increases as p declines. 
3. To permit negatively sloped input demand curves, we assume that F(@) and G(@) are not 
linearly homogeneous in K and L.  To harmonize with the Heckscher-Ohlin model, one 
may introduce a third fixed factor, land L, and that production functions are linearly 
homogeneous in the three factors. 
4. Obviously, an ideal solution lies in eliminating the factor price rigidity.  In the presence of 
factor price rigidity, trade restrictions can be a second best policy.  Export taxes are 
precluded by assumption (iii). 
5. It can be shown that optimal production subsidy achieves full employment.  The proof is 
available upon request and is not included here. 
6. Let pf be the domestic price at which full employment is attained and dY(pf)/dp = 0.  The 
assumption of unemployment implies that the probability that the foreign price p* is 
below pf is unity.   
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